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Abstract
Corruption, both in its high and low typologies, is an 
enduring problem in Africa and is widely believed to 
constitute a major drag on the continent’s progress 
and development writ large. This paper focuses on the 
development of the problem of high-level corruption, and 
struggles against it, in Africa’s most populous and oil-
rich country, Nigeria. The paper critically examines the 
past and present experience of corruption in Nigeria and 
concludes, especially in the light of current oil-related 
scandals, that Nigeria is regressing rapidly in its war 
against corruption. The paper is historically anchored and 
identifies key periods and issues in Nigeria’s political 
trajectory which set the stage for a current system that 
tolerates, even rewards, corruption. 
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Africa has suffered from governments that have looted 
the resources of the state; that could not or would not 
deliver services to their people; that in many cases were 
predatory, corruptly extracting their countries’ resources, 
that maintained control through violence and bribery; 
and that squandered and stolen aid. (UK Commission for 
Africa, 2005, p.106)
INTRODUCTION
Corruption dates back to human antiquity. In a fourth 
century B.C. treatise on public administration in India, 
Kautiliya clearly underscores the lure of filthy lucre: 
“Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey that 
finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible 
for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a 
bit of the King’s revenue” (Kangle, 1972, p.91). In 
the same treatise, he acknowledges the surreptitious 
nature of pilferage: “Just as fish moving under water 
cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not 
drinking water, so government servants employed in 
the government work cannot be found out while taking 
money for themselves” (Ibid). While corruption in 
one form or another is an ancient problem, it has had 
“variegated incidence in different times at different 
places, with varying degrees of damaging consequences” 
(Bardhan, 1997, p.1320). It has also involved a wide 
spectrum of practices as well as a range of analyses of 
its causes and consequences especially in developing 
countries (Harsch, 1993, pp.33-34). 
This paper focuses on the development of the problem 
of high-level corruption, and struggles against it, in 
Africa’s most populous and oil-rich country, Nigeria. The 
paper critically examines the past and present experience 
of corruption in Nigeria and concludes, especially in 
the light of current oil-related scandals, that Nigeria is 
regressing rapidly in its war against corruption. The paper 
is historically anchored and identifies key periods and 
issues in Nigeria’s politico-economic trajectory which 
set the stage for a current system that rewards corruption 
rather than punish it. 
The rest of the paper is structured into seven sections. 
The second explores the meaning of corruption and draws 
a distinction between high-level and low-level corruption. 
The third section discusses the paradox of development 
in Nigeria. The fourth section traces the political culture 
of corruption in Nigeria to particular regimes. The fifth 
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section exposes recent oil-related corruption scandals in 
Nigeria under Goodluck Jonathan’s current administration. 
The sixth section examines the costs of high-level 
corruption in Nigeria. The seventh section focuses on 
Nigeria’s struggle against elite corruption (as spearheaded 
by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 
EFCC) and its associated challenges. The concluding 
section summarises the entire discourse and recommends 
a way forward for Nigeria.
1.  CORRUPTION EXPLAINED
The definition of corruption is much contested in the 
literature. This notwithstanding, contemporary social 
science tends to define corruption as “a general term 
covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations 
of personal gain, which need not be monetary” (Bayley, 
1966, p.720). Since the publication of his 1967 seminal 
paper on “Corruption and Political Development,” Nye’s 
public-office definition of corruption has become the locus 
classicus and will be adopted in this paper, forte de mieux. 
Nye (1967, p.419) identifies corruption with “behaviour 
which deviates from the normal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” 
When extended to include unscrupulous performance, 
undue pressures to influence official decisions and failure 
to act, Nye’s definition should suffice as a working 
definition in most instances. It underscores the behavioural 
element—intentional deviation for personal gain. It covers 
most market-centred definitions that focus on maximizing 
pecuniary gains, and it can be stretched to take in public 
interest definitions which identify corrupt acts as those 
which favour private interests of the dominant capitalist. 
Perhaps, the only area that is not covered by Nye’s 
definition is that of “noble” or “patriotic” corruption 
where public officials supposedly turn their private vices 
into public benefits (Werner, 1983, p.147). 
Corruption may be much contested in the literature but 
it is generally not difficult to recognise when observed 
(Fagbadebo, 2007, pp.28-37). Given the multi-faceted, 
dynamic and flexible nature of corruption, it is useful 
to clarify some practices in Africa that fall within the 
purview of corruption. According to the excerpts from 
Article 4, clause 1, of the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related 
Offences, corrupt practices include: 
a) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, 
by a public official or any other person, of any goods of 
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, 
promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another 
person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in 
the performance of his or her public functions
b) The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to 
a public official or any other person, of any goods of 
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, 
promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another 
person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in 
the performance of his or her public functions
c) Any act or omission in the discharge of his or her 
duties by a public official or any other person for the 
purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself 
or for a third party
d) The diversion by a public official of any other 
person, for purposes unrelated to those for which they 
were intended, for his or her own benefit or that of a 
third party, of any property belonging to the state or its 
agencies, to an independent agency, or to an individual, 
that such official has received by virtue of his or her 
position
e) The offering or giving, promising, solicitation or 
acceptances, directly or indirectly, or any undue advantage 
to or by any person who directs or works for, in any 
capacity, a private sector entity for himself or herself 
or for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from 
acting, in breach of his or her duties
f) The offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance 
directly or indirectly, or promising of any undue advantage 
to or by any person who asserts or confirms that he or she 
is able to exert any improper influence over the decision 
making of any person performing functions in the public 
or private sector in consideration thereof, whether the 
undue advantage is for himself or for anyone else, as 
well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer 
or the promise of such an advantage, in consideration 
of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted 
or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the 
intended result
g) The significant increase in the assets of a public-
official or any other person that he or she cannot 
reasonably explain
h) The use or concealment of proceeds derived from 
any of the acts referred to in this article, and
i) Participation as a principal, co-principal, agent, 
instigator, or accomplice after the fact, or in any other 
manner in the commission or attempted commission of, in 
any collaboration or conspiracy to commit any of the acts 
referred to in this article (Agbiboa, 2010, p.481).
1.1  Levels of Corruption
A salient and oft-drawn distinction in the corruption 
literature concerns the differences between high-level (also 
known as grand) corruption and low-level (also known as 
petty) corruption. A further discussion of these distinctions 
is of crucial importance to the current study since its 
overall thematic concern is low-level corruption.v
1.1.1  High-Level Corruption
This level of corruption describes a situation in which 
highly placed individuals abuse their privileged positions 
to extract large bribes from national and transnational 
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corporations, appropriate significant payoffs from contract 
scams, and siphon large sums of money from the public 
treasury into private bank accounts. In former Zaire 
(present-day DRC), President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-
1997), for a classic example, compromised the development 
of his country by diverting 60 percent of the annual budget 
to personal bank accounts oversees, bragging on U.S. 
television in 1984 that he was the second richest man in the 
world. In the Philippines, Mrs Imelda Marcos, “First Lady” 
until 1986, admitted that there was at least US$800 million 
stashed away in Swiss bank accounts during her time in 
office. Since most of Africa’s wealth is often secreted 
abroad, it is important to briefly define the related concept 
of money laundering—a process which purposely obscures 
the origin of money and its source (Agbiboa, 2013). The 
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
defines money laundering as:
(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing 
that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origins of 
the property or of helping any person who is involved in 
the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal 
consequences of his or her actions. (ii) The concealment 
or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, or ownership of or rights with respect to 
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of 
crime (UN, 2000). 
The principal motivation of money launderers is to 
confuse the onlooker and confound the inquirer. The 
aim is to create the pseudo-impression that the funds in 
their possession were generated from licit businesses 
so as to thwart any efforts to trace the funds back to the 
crime and by doing so, they are able to escape being 
convicted for the earlier crime. Money laundering poses a 
major impasse in a globalised era of modern information 
technology which enables everyone to communicate and 
to carry out instantaneous electronic transfers of large 
sums across borders. As noted by Hiresh Patel: “The boom 
in technology over the last economic period has acted 
as a catalyst for the boom in fraud. Computerisation and 
globalisation have made fraud easier, quicker to carry out 
and easier to conceal. Organised criminals in particular 
have taken advantage of this” (as cited in Kochan, 
2010, p.13). Not infrequently, financial intermediaries 
(e.g. bankers and lawyers) have been implicated in 
facilitating the flow of stolen wealth of public officials 
from developing countries through structures in Western 
countries (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010). In 
pursuit of organisational and personal interest, the 
financial intermediaries create enabling structures that 
support illicit activities of political and economic elite.
1.1.2  Low-Level Corruption
Riley said that “Petty corruption is obviously not petty to 
those who experience it” (p.191). This level of corruption, 
particularly pervasive and damaging for the poorest 
in poorer societies, involves smaller sums and usually 
implicates ordinary people or more junior officials with 
considerable discretion in their dealings with citizens and 
little accountability. Low-level corruption captures the 
experiences of petty bribery and corruption that citizens 
encounter in their everyday interaction with corrupt public 
officials, especially in their struggle to obtain public 
services such as health care, education, paying taxes, 
and obtaining licenses. Instances of low-level corruption 
include bribes offered to a policeman to avoid a fine, a 
backhander to a customs officer to avoid overtaxing or the 
use of government vehicles for private business by drivers. 
In the former Zaire, “corrupt payments were necessary 
to enrol children in schools, to visit public health clinics, 
to get licenses and permits” (Riley, 1999, p.190). So 
generalised and banalized was low-level corruption in 
Zaire that Zairians developed an elaborate terminology 
to describe it: “beans for the children, a little something, 
an encouragement, an envelope, something to tie the two 
ends with, to deal, to come to an understanding, to take 
care of me, to pay the beer, to short-circuit, to see clearly, 
to be lenient or comprehensive, to put things in place, to 
find a Zairian solution” (Ibid). Addressing government 
officials in 1984, Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire’s former 
president, once said “if you steal, do not steal too much at 
a time. You may be arrested. Steal cleverly, little by little”. 
According to Olivier de Sardan (1999, p.28), high-
level corruption has nothing in common―in terms 
of scale, social space and actors―with low-level 
corruption. The latter, he argues, “is extremely familiar 
to ordinary mortals, who come into contact with it, 
exploit it or become its victims, on an everyday basis.” 
The differences between low-level and high-level 
corruption notwithstanding, Olivier de Sardan argue that 
it makes sense to understand them as two extremes “on 
a continuum of forms of corruption” (Ibid). Without any 
prejudice to the significance and pervasiveness of low-
level corruption in Africa, the main focus of this paper is 
on high-level corruption and its negative ramifications for 
Nigeria’s development.
2.  THE PARADOX OF DEVELOPMENT
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the 
men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 
10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided 
permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers 
or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, that make the 
country look big for nothing before international circles, 
those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian 
political calendar back by their words and deeds... 
(Nzeogwu’s Declaration of Martial Law on January 15, 
1966) 
With a population of roughly 113 million, Nigeria 
is undoubtedly a major hegemon in Africa. Nigeria is 
influential both within Africa and in the global economy—
not least in the proven capability of her internal events to 
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destabilize the global oil market. Unfortunately, Nigeria is 
a country where nearly 100 million of its citizens survive 
on less than one US dollar a day (Agbiboa, 2013). In 
January 2012, Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) published a report showing that the percentage 
of Nigerians living in “absolute poverty” had increased 
nationwide from 55 percent to 61 percent between 2004 
and 2010 (NBS, 2010). This considerable rise is notable 
in a country that, in 2011, was the sixth largest oil-
exporting country in the world. Drawing on a World Bank 
report, Afiekhena (2005) estimates that “about 80 per cent 
of Nigeria’s oil and natural gas revenues accrue to one 
percent of the country’s population. The other 99 percent 
of the population receives the remaining 20 per cent of the 
oil and gas revenues, leaving Nigeria with the lowest per-
capita oil export earning put at $212 per person in 2004.” 
In most cases, this ill-amassed wealth is stashed in bank 
accounts overseas. As Ojodu (1992, p.33) once said that 
“corruption has become [Nigeria’s] major export apart 
from oil.”
Nowhere is Nigeria’s corruption and development 
failure best illustrated than in the oil-rich Niger Delta 
region which produces the country’s oil wealth. As one 
astute commentator notes, the Niger Delta remains “the 
ultimate desecration and monumental testament to the 
failure and criminality of the [Nigerian] ruling class” 
(Ogbunwezeh, 2009). A study by Ibeanu (2006, p.1) 
reveals that: “There is one doctor per 82,000 people, 
rising to one doctor per 132,000 people in some areas, 
especially the rural areas, which is more than three times 
the national average of 40,000 people per doctor. Only 
27 percent of the people in the Delta have access to safe 
drinking water and about 30 percent of households have 
access to electricity” (Ibid). In 2013, political corruption 
stemming from interethnic rivalry and aimed at the control 
of the state machinery for private interests is at the root of 
pervasive social conflict for which Nigeria is deservedly 
notorious. The extent of Nigeria’s failure is further 
discernible when we compare the country to Indonesia, 
another huge, populous, ethnically diverse, and oil-nation. 
Both Nigeria and Indonesia have suffered military rule 
and, at times, massive bloodshed. At independence, both 
countries were nations of subsistence farmers. Both struck 
oil and were deluged with petrodollars. But here the 
parallels cease. Indonesia has not exactly been a model of 
good governance, yet average incomes rose from under 
$200 in 1974 to $680 in 2001. This is despite the Asian 
financial crash of 1997. In 2002, the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) reported that Nigerians are more 
than twice as likely as Indonesians to be illiterate or to die 
before the age of 40 (UNDP, 2002). The sobering reality 
of scarcity amidst surfeit in Nigeria has led some analysts 
to describe Nigeria as a “paradox of plenty” and a “political 
economy of state robbery” (Agbiboa, 2012, p.325). 
3 .   THE POLIT ICAL CULTURE OF 
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA
The Nigerian state may be understood from its military 
origins which contributed significantly to entrenched 
corruption in Nigeria. The military ruled Nigeria for 
nearly 30 years out of its first 40 years of independence. 
Military governments were in power from 1966 to 1979 
and from 1983 to 1999, with the exception of a 3-month 
period in 1993 that saw an interim civilian administration. 
No other country in Africa has been as coercively 
dominated for so long a period by their own military as the 
people of Nigeria. Thus, Nigeria is a classic example of a 
militarised state which consists of the use of (or the threat 
of) violence to settle political conflicts, the legitimization 
of state violence, the curtailment of freedom of opinion, 
the domination of military values over civilian life, the 
violation of human rights, extrajudicial killings and 
the gross repression of the people. As the late Nigerian 
political scientist Claude Ake (1992, p.16) argues, 
“the postcolonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an 
apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces 
remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on coercion 
for compliance, rather than authority.” 
The Nigerian state may also be explained from the 
perspective of its colonial origins which ensured its 
untimely integration into global capitalism. This was to 
facilitate the sole raison d’être of colonialism, namely 
the exploitation of capital and surplus value. Thus, 
the conception of the state as an instrument of private 
accumulation and patron-client ties as the dominant mode 
of political relations began to crystallise. The attendant 
privatisation of the state, defined as the appropriation 
of the state to service private interests by the dominant 
faction of the elite, became woven into the tapestry of the 
political system so as to thwart any attempt to reverse the 
trend. It is against this backdrop that Omotola (2006, p.7) 
describes the Nigeria state as a “rentier state dependent 
almost entirely on revenues from oil, grossly lacking in 
autonomy from vested interests, and relying on the use 
of force to quench all protests against its exploitative and 
accumulative dispositions...” Ake (1992, p.55) puts it even 
more succinctly as “the militarization of commerce” and 
the “privatisation of the state.”
Out of the amalgam of ills bedevilling the Nigerian 
state, including thuggery in politics, lack of commitment 
to democratic ideals,  ethnicity and bureaucratic 
incompetence and, increasingly, religious extremism, 
elite corruption has arisen to subsume all other vices and 
become the emblematic defect of the fledgling republic. 
Between 1960 and 1999 state actors in Nigeria siphoned 
over $440 billion (Agbiboa, 2011). This is six times the 
Marshal Plan—the sum total needed to rebuild devastated 
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Through high-level corruption, conspicuous consumption 
and foolish investments, successive governments 
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squandered the oil windfall of the 1970s. In fact, since 
they borrowed billions against future oil revenues and 
misspent that money too, it is fair to say that the Nigerian 
government blew more than its entire oil windfall. By 
1998, Nigerians were poorer than when the oil boom 
began in 1974, and the country was saddled with debts of 
around $30 billion (Guest, 2004). 
High-level corruption in Nigeria is traceable, in 
particular, to two specific venal military regimes: General 
Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and General Sani Abacha 
(1993-1999). As one commentator notes:
Brazen acts of venality in the public service reached 
unprecedented levels under the military regimes of 
Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani 
Abacha (1993-1998). From the very apex of political 
leadership to the bottom of the ladder, public officers... 
wallowed openly in corruption, but government all but 
admitted that it was helpless to check the advance of 
corruption” (Ocheje, 2001, p.175). 
3.1  The Babangida-Abacha Era: The Apogee of 
Corruption
The main distinguishing feature of corruption in the 
Babangida regime was the pervasive culture of impunity: 
any of his acolytes, however high or low in status, could 
loot the treasury to their heart’s content with impunity, 
provided they remained absolutely loyal and committed to 
the leader. Those who backslide or waver in their loyalty 
and commitment were terrorised with all the coercive 
instruments of state power, even when they had done no 
wrong. (Osoba, 1996, p.382) 
Babangida holds the record as the first military dictator 
in Nigeria to declare himself “President and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces” (Ibid, p.381). The high 
level of corruption during the Babangida era was given 
greater rein by two propitious factors: the nine-year 
tenure of the regime (1985-1993) and the huge surge in 
oil revenue, including the famous oil windfall occasioned 
by the Iraq War in 1991. A whopping sum of US$12.67 
billion earned during the war could not be accounted 
for by the Babangida-led regime. According to Ribadu 
(2006), former Nigerian anti-corruption czar, this era 
was “tainted with profligacy, wanton waste, political 
thuggery and coercion...” Osoba (1996, p.381) argues 
that for the eight years of Babangida’s stay in power, the 
regime never took a public stance against corruption. 
Instead it proceeded with hitherto unknown dynamism 
to establish a sui generis military autocracy, grounded on 
cronyism, blatant corruption of high-profile individuals 
and groups in society and ruthless and systematic 
suppression of so-called “radicals,” “extremists,” and 
other real or imagined opponents of the regime. Indeed, it 
would appear that “the widespread and systematic use of 
corrupt means by Babangida to ‘settle’ many actual and 
potential critics rested on the impeccable presupposition 
that if he corrupted enough Nigerians there would be 
nobody to speak out on the issue of corruption or public 
accountability” (Ibid). 
A curious action taken in the late 1980s by the 
Babangida regime was its release of the ill-gotten assets 
seized from top government officials who served in 
Yakubu Gowon’s regime (1966-1975), after these officials 
were found guilty of corrupt enrichment by a special 
military tribunal. These seized assets were returned to 
their “owners” (Ocheje, 2001, p.173). Babangida also 
released most of the corrupt politicians incarcerated 
by Buhari-Idiagbon regime and restored to them their 
lost military ranks, in addition to tendering a national 
apology to the officers. In 1991, Babangida’s regime also 
formally rehabilitated all the military officers who had 
been probed, found guilty of corruption, and dismissed 
“with ignominy” from the Armed Forces by Murtala 
Mohammed’s regime in 1976. Among the more prominent 
of these are Jim Nwobodo, former governor of Anambra 
State, who was convicted of corruption, sentenced to 22 
years imprisonment and ordered to refund N9.95 million, 
but later became a Nigerian senator; Solomon Lar, 
former governor of Plateau State, found guilty of corrupt 
operation of “security” vote, and sentenced to 21 years in 
jail, but later became chairperson of the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party; Samuel Ogbemudia, former military 
governor of the then Bendel State, found guilty of corrupt 
enrichment and made to forfeit millions of naira worth 
of assets to the federal government by a special tribunal 
under the Murtala Mohammed regime in 1975, but went 
on to become a civilian governor of the same state in 
1983; Philip Asiodu, found guilty of corruption by the 
same tribunal, but who later became senior presidential 
advisor on the economy. Ocheje (2001, p.173) describes 
this action as “political fecklessness in the matter of the 
control of corruption that abounds in Nigeria’s political 
history.” 
As a consequence of this irresponsible action, the 
wrong signal was sent to public officials in Nigeria that 
corruption in the public sector was a pardonable offence, 
thus making conformance to ethical standards appear to be 
foolish. The above pattern of “pardoning” and recycling 
corrupt elites has continued to this day in Nigeria. In the 
most recent case, the government of Goodluck Jonathan 
granted pardon to ex-Bayelsa state Governor, and former 
ally, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha (1999-2005)—who was 
convicted of stealing millions of dollars during his time in 
office—because he had been “remorseful” (BBC News, 
13 March 2013). Alamieyeseigha was also declared free 
to run for elections again. Nuhu Ribadu, former Nigerian 
anti-corruption czar, condemned the “irresponsible 
decision” and noted that the pardon was ‘the final nail’ in 
the coffin for fighting corruption in the country (Ibid).
Moving on, the Babangida regime turned the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the country’s bank with a legally 
guaranteed independent board of directors and power 
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to issue the country’s legal currency and to monitor and 
regulate the country’s banking system, into an instrument 
for private accumulation. Under the administrative and 
structural changes in the CBN announced in the 1988 
budget, the Bank was transferred to the office of the 
President and the CBN governor was obliged to report 
directly to the President. Following the CBN Decree of 
1991, the president’s control of CBN became complete. 
As a former top official noted:
In practical terms the 1991 CBN Decree made the 
President the sole authority for deciding the nation’s 
monetary and banking policy, and for issuing directives 
for its implementation. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
had become the ‘Central Bank of the President’ (CBP), a 
unit or department in the office of the president carrying 
out the president’s binding directives on monetary and 
banking policy. (Osoba, 1996, p.382) 
It was through this “legitimate” means that Babangida 
was able to fund his numerous corrupt and “white-
elephant” project, as well as to transfer public assets 
into his foreign bank accounts or the private coffers 
of members of his regime and their supporters. As the 
Pius Okigbo Panel of Inquiry into the Central Bank’s 
Account during the Babangida era revealed: “it was this 
unscrupulous subjugation of the CBN to the president’s 
will that made it possible for Babangida to siphon some 
$12.4 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenue from the CBN 
account into a so-called dedication account, money from 
which he was able to use without being accountable to 
anyone” (Osoba, 1996, p.382). Strikingly, in the years 
between 1985 (when Babangida ascended power) and 
1993 (when he exited power), the money in circulation 
in Nigeria jumped from N11.8 billion to N100.5 billion, 
thus “injecting an intolerably high level of cumulative 
devaluation and inflation into the national currency and 
economy” (Ibid). The foregoing combined to dramatically 
lower the level of income and living standard of the vast 
majority of Nigerians during this era.
If Babangida’s era was bad, Abacha’s was worse. In 
five years of dictatorship and frenetic looting, Abacha 
paralyzed the machinery of governance and pauperized 
the citizenry. He notably arrested/incarcerated commercial 
bank chiefs in Lagos while he and his kitchen cabinet 
were simultaneously stealing and stashing away in banks 
around the world of between US$5 Billion to US$50 
Billion (Agbiboa, 2012). Nearly 15 years after Abacha’s 
death, the Swiss Government has said that it has so far 
repatriated the sum of US$700 million stolen by the 
late dictator and deposited in several Swiss banks. The 
Nigerian government has also recovered over $100 
million of the funds stolen by Abacha and his family from 
the autonomous British island of Jersey and an estimated 
$150 million from Luxembourg. Other funds belonging 
to Abacha remain frozen in accounts in Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. In November 
2009, Abacha’s son was convicted by a Swiss court for 
his role in a criminal organisation and seized $350 million 
in assets stolen from Nigeria (Ploch, 2010). In direct 
consequence of so much venality in public life, poverty 
has now embedded itself among the people of Nigeria. 
Also, under Abacha, the Nigerian “rule of law” was dealt 
a fatal blow. For example, the regime enacted Decree No. 
12, of 1994, which officially removed the authority of the 
courts to investigate, let alone challenge, the actions of 
members of the regime. Ake (1995, p.5) argues that when 
this happens, “the state effectively ceases to exist as a 
state and compromises its ability to pursue development.” 
The unfettered nature of corruption under military rule 
was confirmed by former Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo: “There was corruption! Corruption! And 
Corruption! Everywhere and all the time! Corruption was 
not only rife, it had eaten so deeply into the marrow of 
our existence that looters and fraudsters had become our 
heroes, and it seemed we could no longer place any faith 
in honesty and decency and hard work” (as cited in Njoku, 
2000). Alas, Obasanjo did not fare any better. 
3.2  Olusegun Obasanjo: Hope Betrayed
The hope that Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 
would mark an appreciable breakaway from the corrupt 
past turned out betrayed. The democratic government 
of Obasanjo, a former military ruler and respected 
international statesman who had handed power back to 
civilians in 1979, was expected to be a bridge between the 
military and civilians and between the North and South; 
“a new broom who would sweep out the corruption and 
abuses of military brass hats who had lost any sense of 
purpose beyond plundering the national treasury and 
brutally pummelling innocent citizens into submission” 
(Adebajo, 2008, p.5). However, Obasanjo’s government 
was ridden with not only corruption but also development 
failure writ large. The latter is evident in the fact that 
despite spending over $2 billion in reconstructing roads 
and over one trillion naira on the power sector, Obasanjo 
failed to revive the country’s decrepit infrastructure and 
epileptic power supply, and the country’s oil refineries 
were producing less when he left office in 2007 that 
when he was first elected in 1999 (Agbiboa, 2012). The 
Obasanjo regime also announced that it had lost $4 billion 
in potential oil revenues in 2006 to insecurity and the 
damage of pipelines by ethnic militias in the oil-rich Niger 
Delta (Ibid).
Despite his flawed regime, Obasanjo’s rule was not 
without some merits. Early in his term in office, he 
correctly identified Nigeria’s debt issue as an obstacle to 
sustainable development. Along with his reliable finance 
minister (between 2003 and 2006) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, 
he was able to broker a deal that effectively wiped out 
Nigeria’s entire $30 billion external debt by paying $12.4 
billion and having $17.6 billion annulled. This was the 
largest such financial deal in sub-Saharan Africa (Adebajo, 
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2008). Most importantly, Obasanjo’s Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), spearheaded by 
the fearless Nuhu Ribadu, recovered over $5 billion in 
stolen assets and prosecuted corrupt businessmen and 
policemen (Agbiboa, 2012). In unprecedented moves 
in 2005, Tofa Balogun, Nigeria’s Inspector General of 
Police, was convicted of corruption and jailed; Fabian 
Osuji, education minister, and Mobolaji Osomo, housing 
and urban development minister, were also dismissed 
from office for respectively bribing legislators to pass 
a budget and selling government properties (Adebajo, 
2008).
In collaboration with the London Metropolitan Police, 
the EFCC also uncovered two cases of corruption and 
money laundering among Nigerian governors. In the first 
case, Joshua Dariye, former governor of Plateau state, 
was found to operate 25 bank accounts in London alone to 
juggle money and evade the law. Like many governors of 
his ilk, Dariye used front agents to penetrate western real 
estate markets where he purchased choice and expensive 
properties. The London Metropolitan Police determined 
Dariye had acquired €10 million in benefits through 
criminal conduct in London, while domestically EFCC 
were able to restrain proceeds of his crimes worth $34 
million (Agbiboa, 2012). The other case involves DSP 
Alamieyeseigha, former governor of Bayelsa state, who 
was discovered to be in possession of four properties in 
London valued at about £10 million, plus another property 
in Cape Town valued at $1.2 million. £1 million, in cash, 
was found in his bedroom at his apartment in London. 
£2 million was restrained at the Royal Bank of Scotland 
in London and over $240 million in Nigeria. This is in 
addition to bank accounts traced to Cyprus, Denmark, 
USA and Bahamas (Ribadu, 2006).
Unfortunately, the corruption cleanup campaigns 
of the Obasanjo administration where short-lived. His 
administration soon became littered with postures of 
reform, with grandiose promises and conspicuous lack 
of delivery. Okonji-Iweala was dismissed from office 
by Obasanjo as finance minister in 2006, and the EFCC 
was accused of manipulation by Obasanjo to target his 
political opponents in a selective manner (Agbiboa, 
2012). According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 
2007, p.3), the EFCC was “used [by Obasanjo] as a 
political weapon to whip political foes, especially state 
governors likely to stand for the presidency and their 
supporters, into line.” To this end, five state governors, 
some of whom were considered contenders for the PDP 
presidential nomination, were impeached in 2005-2006 on 
allegations of corruption. Obasanjo’s botched attempt to 
change the Nigerian constitution in April 2006 to afford 
him the opportunity of running for a third presidential 
term badly damaged whatever democratic credentials he 
has. He reportedly offered bribes of $400,000 to senators 
and representatives; had armed police break up a meeting 
in Abuja of legislators and governors opposed to a third 
term; and threatened state governors who failed to support 
his bid with impeachment (Agbiboa, 2012). 
Obasanjo’s legacy was further soiled by an ugly spat 
with his vice-president, Atiku Abubakar, which saw 
both men accusing each other of corruption apropos 
the government’s Petroleum Technology Trust (The 
Guardian, 23 May 2007). Obasanjo attempted to use 
the EFCC to prevent Atiku from contesting the 2007 
presidential elections on grounds of corruption, declaring 
a public holiday to hold-up the seating of the country’s 
Supreme Court. Under Obasanjo, who acted as his own 
oil minister throughout the eight years of his rule, Nigeria 
staged arguably the most fraudulent elections in its 52-
year history. Ballot boxes were stuffed and stolen, voters 
intimidated, and results appeared out of thin air in areas 
where voting had clearly not taken place, particularly in 
the Niger Delta (Adebajo, 2008). In the end, Obasanjo’s 
rule proved to be a bundle of contradictions. Considered 
as an indispensable force for stability, he instead oversaw 
one of Nigeria’s worst periods of instability. Considered 
a force for unity, he presided uneasily over a country 
that is perhaps now more divided than at any time in its 
history since the civil war of 1967-1970. Considered a 
force for national salvation, he instead watched helplessly 
as the country was nearly torn apart by sectarian violence 
(Ibid). While much of the decay in the Nigerian polity had 
set in under successive corrupt and inept administration 
since 1979, the situation was further aggravated under 
Obasanjo’s rule. 
4.  RECENT CORRUPTION SCANDALS 
IN NIGERIA
According to a recently leaked investigative report into 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry by the Chairman of the 
Petroleum Revenue Task Force, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, 
nearly $30 billion was lost in the last 10 years in an 
apparent gas price-fixing scam implicating government 
officials and foreign energy firms (BBC News, 24 April 
2012). The 205-page parliamentary report uncovered a 
long list of alleged wrongdoings involving oil retailers, 
Nigeria’s Oil Management Company and the state Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation. Specifically, the report 
showed that oil and gas companies owe the Nigerian 
treasury $3 billion in royalties (Agbiboa, forthcoming). 
Between 2005 and 2011, another $566 million was owed 
by companies for the right to exploit an oil block, known 
as “signature bonuses” (ThisDay, 25 October 2012). 
According to the leaks, a total of fifteen fuel importers 
collected more than $300 million a couple of years ago 
without importing any fuel, while more than 100 oil 
marketers collected the same amount of money on several 
occasions. In August 2012, the former World Bank-Vice-
President for Africa, Dr. Ezekwesili, announced that an 
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estimated $400 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenue had been 
stolen or misspent since the country’s independence in 
1960. She further claimed that $6.8 billion was drained 
from Nigeria between 2009 and 2012 in the fuel subsidy 
scam. In 2011 alone, the Nigerian government paid 900 
times more in the subsidy than was budgeted, suggesting 
the complicity of the finance ministry and the central bank 
in the arrangement (Reuters, 19 April 2012). In July 2012, 
the government released a list of those who had benefited 
illegally from the subsidy fund, which implicated 
key government officials in the Goodluck Jonathan 
administration.
A recent report submitted to the United States 
Congress by the Secretary of State John Kerry has 
confirmed massive corruption scandals at all levels of 
the Goodluck Jonathan-led government. The document 
entitled “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 2012” was prepared by the Department of State using 
information from US embassies and consulates abroad, 
foreign government officials, non-governmental and 
international organisations, and published reports. Section 
4 of the report—which deals with “Corruption and Lack 
of Transparency in Government” in Nigeria, it was stated 
that “Massive, widespread, and pervasive corruption 
affected all levels of government and the security forces” 
(Transparency for Nigeria, 22 April 2012). In addition, 
the report scored the Nigerian judiciary system low as it 
noted, “There was a widespread perception judges were 
easily bribed and litigants could not rely on the courts 
to render impartial judgements. Citizens encountered 
long delays and alleged requests from judicial officials 
for bribes to expedite cases or obtain favourable rulings” 
(Ibid). The report noted that though Nigerian law provides 
criminal penalties for official corruption, “government did 
not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently 
engaged in corrupt practices with impunity” (Agbiboa, 
forthcoming). 
5.  THE COST OF CORRUPTION IN 
NIGERIA
It was Agbese (1992, p.220) who argued that in 
contemporary Nigeria, political groups use any means at 
their disposal to capture the government and employ the 
latter’s redistributive powers to enrich themselves. Once 
the state is captured, “the new regime erects entry barriers, 
making certain that competitors have virtually no chance 
of capturing the government legally” (Mbaku, 2000, 
p.37). In some instances, incumbents have enacted laws 
that make any form of opposition treasonable offences 
punishable by death. This is done in an effort to reduce to 
its barest minimum any challenges to the monopolisation 
of political space and the control of resource allocation 
by the incumbent regime. Under these conditions, the 
state falls short of its social contract to protect citizens 
and their property from aggression and to provide society 
with public goods. Instead, the state is privatised and now 
serves as an instrument for the private accumulation of 
the predatory status quo. The cost of corruption especially 
in Africa is very high. The African Union (AU) recently 
estimated that up to $140 billion (roughly 25 per cent of 
official gross domestic product of sub-Saharan Africa) is 
lost annually to the region owing to high-level corruption.
In Nigeria, as in the rest of Africa, corruption has 
eroded democratic ideals, slowed down the pace of 
development writ large, contributed to governmental 
instability and domestic terrorism, distorted electoral 
processes, perverted the rule of law and created 
bureaucratic quagmires. Economic growth in Nigeria is 
stunted because foreign direct investment is discouraged 
and small businesses within the country often find it 
impossible to overcome the “start-up costs” required 
because of corruption. Corruption is, above all, a crime 
against society primarily because (1) it undermines 
political decisions, leads to inefficient use of resources, 
and benefits the unscrupulous at the cost of the law 
abiding; (2) it erodes moral authority, weakens the 
efficiency of state operations, increases opportunities 
for organized crime, encourages police brutality, adds 
to taxpayer’s burdens, and affects the poor directly; 
and (3) it allows immunity for criminal acts so that the 
law is for sale to the highest bidder. While corruption 
in the post-independence period has allowed a few 
individuals to amass enormous wealth for themselves, 
it has impoverished the majority of Nigerian citizens 
and prevented the government from devising and 
implementing effective poverty alleviation programmes 
(Agbiboa, 2010). Moreover, rampant elite corruption in 
Nigeria has, over time, taught a dangerously disruptive 
lesson to the generality of the Nigerian populace: being 
honest and law-abiding does not pay! (Osoba, 1996). 
Consequently some of the ordinary people who have 
learnt this lesson from the top then try to replicate the 
corrupt practices in everyday forms of sociability through 
acts of bribery, peculation and embezzlement of public 
funds. It is in this way that corruption as a way of life has 
become embedded and routinised in everyday forms of 
sociability (Olivier de Sardan, 1999). 
6.  THE EFCC AND THE CHECKERED 
STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
Since most of the proceeds of high-level corruption in 
Nigeria (as in many other developing African economies) 
are stored in foreign bank accounts in the developed world, 
there has been an increasing domestic attempt in Nigeria, 
especially in the post-1999 era, to curb the spread of elite 
corruption through its money laundering dimensions. 
From the 26th to the 29th of August 2001, Nigeria held 
its First National Seminar on Economic crime. The 
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seminar created a forum for Nigerian stakeholders to 
discuss practical ways of combating economic crime in 
the country which was becoming an increasing necessity. 
The idea of the seminar was first mooted in September 
2000 by the Nigerian delegates at the 18th International 
Symposium on Economic Crime held at the University 
of Cambridge. Following the successfully held First 
National Seminar, Nigeria became a signatory country to 
the UN Conventions and subsequently passed into law 
the Money Laundering (Prohibition) ACT (MLPA) in 
2004. The MLPA provided for specific implementations 
of various aspects of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) and 40 recommendations of the UN Conventions 
against money laundering. To facilitate the monitoring of 
financial transactions, section 2 of the MLPA mandates 
financial and non-financial institutions to report a transfer 
to or from a foreign country of funds or securities of a 
sum exceeding $10,000 or its equivalent by any person 
or corporate body. In December 2002, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established 
to enforce MLPA and to prosecute Nigerians engaged in 
high-level corruption money laundering.
According to a detailed 2011 report by the Human 
Rights Watch, since its inception, the EFCC has arraigned 
30 nationally prominent political figures on corruption 
charges and has recovered some US$11 billion through 
its efforts (HRW, 2011). However, many of the high-
level corruption cases against the political elite have made 
little progress in the courts: there have been only four 
convictions to date—one of those, Lucky Igbinedion, 
former Edo State governor, was given a sentence so 
light after pleading guilty that it made mockery of his 
conviction. Tafa Balogun, Nigeria’s former inspector 
general of police was charged to court in April 2005, 
just months after being forced to retire from his official 
position. Balogun pleaded guilty of failing to declare his 
assets, and his front companies were convicted of eight 
counts of money laundering. In November 2005, Balogun 
was sentenced to six months in prison and the court 
ordered the seizure of his assets amounting to the excess 
of $150 million (Agbiboa, 2012). Many Nigerians saw the 
sentence as light given the severity of the allegations—
“he stood accused of financial crimes allegedly committed 
at a time when he was serving as Nigeria’s chief law 
enforcement officer” (HRW, 2011, p.93).
In 2005, Nigerian Senate Speaker Adolphus Wabara 
was forced to resign after President Obasanjo accused him 
of taking more than $400,000 in bribes from the Minister 
of Education, Fabian Osuji (who was also dismissed from 
office). In yet another cause célèbre case of high-level 
corruption, Olabode George, a powerful figure within 
the ruling party under President Obasanjo and chairman 
of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) for a time, was 
charged with contract-related offenses by the EFCC in 
August 2008. In October 2009 he was convicted and 
sentenced to two and a half years in prison following a 
surprisingly efficient trial. However, upon his release from 
prison in February 2011, he was treated to a rapturous 
welcome by key figures in the ruling People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP), including President Obasanjo (HRW, 2011). 
Reacting to the lavish reception, Ribadu noted that “it 
is really a shameful thing that has happened. Instead 
of hiding their heads in shame they have the effrontery 
to celebrate corruption, in fact it is a national shame” 
(Vanguard, 28 February 2011). According to the Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN), “PDP’s action sends a wrong 
signal to Nigerian youths that it is alright to steal public 
funds, since it can even turn them into a ‘hero’ like Bode 
George” (Ibid). So far, this was the EFCC’s first and only 
conviction at trial of a major political figure.
In a recent high profile case, which I discuss here 
in a little more detail, the former governor of Delta 
state (May 1999-May 2007), James Onanefe Ibori, was 
charged with corruption and money laundering by the 
EFCC. The downfall of Ibori began in 2007 when the 
London Metropolitan Police raided the London offices of 
lawyer Bhadresh Gohil and found hard drives containing 
details of many off-shore companies run for Ibori by 
Gohil, fiduciary agent Daniel Benedict McCann, and 
corporate financier Lambertus De Boer. All of these men 
were later jailed for a total of 30 years. Subsequently, 
the United Kingdom courts froze Ibori’s assets there, 
valued at roughly £17 million ($35 million), in early 
August 2007 (Shirbon, 2007). On 12 December 2007, 
Ibori was arrested by the EFCC at the Kwara State Lodge 
in Asokoro, Abuja. The charges brought against him 
included theft of public funds, abuse of office, and money 
laundering. These corruption charges brought against 
Ibori by the government of Obasanjo are among many 
begun by anticorruption czar Nuhu Ribadu against former 
officials of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In 
addition, Ribadu alleged that Ibori attempted to bribe him 
to drop the charges with a cash gift of $15 million, which 
Ribadu immediately lodged in the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). The cash remains in the CBN as an exhibit 
(Agbiboa, forthcoming). On 17 December 2009, a Federal 
High Court sitting in Asaba, Delta State, discharged and 
acquitted Ibori of all 170 charges of corruption brought 
against him by the EFCC. In April 2010, three months 
into President Jonathan’s government, Ibori’s case file was 
reopened. A fresh allegation that he embezzled N40 billion 
($266 million) was pressed against him (BBC News, 21 
April 2010). Attempts to arrest him failed as he fled from 
Abuja to Lagos and then to the creeks of Oghara, his 
homeland in the Niger Delta where he allegedly sought 
shelter under the armed militias in the restive region. 
Ibori claimed that the charges levelled against him were 
frivolous and that he was a victim of political persecution. 
In April 2010, Ibori fled Nigeria, prompting the EFCC 
to request the assistance of Interpol. On 12 July 2010 the 
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Governor of CBN, Malam Sanusi Lamido, revealed that 
Ibori had used Delta State as collateral for N40 billion 
($266 million) loan when he was governor (Agbiboa, 
forthcoming).
On 13 May 2010, Ibori was arrested in Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, under Interpol arrest warrants issued from 
United Kingdom courts and enacted by the Metropolitan 
Police. Ibori was granted bail pending an extradition 
hearing. The Nigerian government and the United Kingdom 
agreed to work together on Ibori’s extradition to the United 
Kingdom, even as his movement became restricted by the 
Dubai authority. In June 2010, UK juries found Ibori’s 
sister, Christine Ibie-Ibori and his associate, Udoamaka 
Okoronkwo, guilty on counts of money laundering, in a 
verdict delivered at the Southwark Crown Court, London. 
Christine Ibie-Ibori and Udoamaka Okoronkwo were 
each sentenced to 5 years in prison on 7 June 2010 by the 
UK court even as the defence counsel pleaded for mercy 
that the convicts were manipulated by Ibori. Accused of 
stealing US$250 million from the Nigerian public purse, 
Ibori pleaded guilty to ten counts of money laundering and 
conspiracy to defraud at Southwark Crown Court, London 
(Barr, 2012). On 17 April 2012, Ibori was sentenced to 13 
years by Southwark Crown Court for his crimes. Among 
possessions confiscated were: (a) a house in Hampstead, 
north London, for £2.2m (b) a property in Shaftesbury, 
Dorset, for £311,000 (c) a £3.2m mansion in Sandton, 
near Johannesburg, South Africa (d) a fleet of armoured 
Range Rovers valued at £600,000 (e) a £120,000 Bentley 
Continental GT, and (f) a Mercedes-Benz bought for 
£407,000 cash, that was shipped direct to his mansion in 
South Africa. Following Ibori’s sentencing, Sue Pattern, 
head of the Crown Prosecution Service central fraud group, 
noted that it would bid to confiscate the assets acquired by 
Ibori “at the expense of some of the poorest people in the 
world” (BBC News, 17 April 2012).
Despite its early promise, the EFCC has fallen far 
short of its potential and a decade after its inception is 
left with a battered reputation and an uncertain record 
of accomplishment. The EFCC’s work is complicated 
by the fact that many banks in Nigeria have failed to 
disclose suspicious transactions and have been accused 
of helping politicians and state governors to launder their 
money through undercover banking transactions, where 
the identities of customers were concealed. Most reports 
on embezzled and siphoned funds in Nigeria also expose 
the complicity of several Western banks in the high-level 
corruption that takes place in Nigeria. Investigations into 
the corrupt dealings of Abacha, for example, revealed more 
than 130 networks of bank accounts both in Nigeria and 
abroad. The British Financial Services Authority revealed 
that London banks had handled $1.3 billion belonging 
to family and friends of the late General (Ribadu, 2006). 
While still the only Nigerian government institution that 
has publicly challenged the ironclad impunity enjoyed 
by Nigeria’s political elite, the EFCC today is snowed 
under with “attitudinal fixations and societal tolerance 
of corrupt conduct, insufficient commitment by all tiers 
of government, attempt to blackmail and politicise the 
work of EFCC, constitutional constraints and lack of 
cooperation by some countries in loot recovery” (HRW, 
2011 p.96). In addition, the EFCC carries out its work 
within a Nigerian political system that continues to reward 
rather than punish corruption.  
CONCLUSION
So far, this paper has critically examined the perennial 
problem of high-level corruption in Nigeria. The paper 
has demonstrated that the problem of corruption in 
Nigeria has not atrophied but has grown virulently to 
become the single biggest obstacle facing the country 
today. “For 40 years,” writes Professor Larry Diamond 
(1993, p.219), “Nigerian officials of every rank have 
systematically misappropriated public wealth. For 40 
years, the gulf has widened between an impoverished 
general populace and the dominant class. Riven by 
ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages, by shifting 
partisan and factional divisions, and by continual civil-
military tensions, Nigeria’s dominant groups nevertheless 
constitute a class bound together by a shared taste for 
extravagant consumption and acquisition financed by 
access to state power.” Ironically, there has hardly been a 
change of regime in Nigerian without them being heavily 
publicized, sometimes in direct response to popular 
anger over the enrichment of the previous office-holders, 
usually as a means of legitimation for the new team in 
power. As Tignor (1993, p.175) argues that “no country 
in the continent has devoted more attention and energy to 
continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria.” 
At times, some regimes were motivated by an 
apparently genuine sense of social justice, and sought to 
instil a commitment to public service and probity. Yet, 
far too often, the problem was that official drives against 
corruption in Nigeria were short-lived, forgotten once the 
initial zeal for reform had faded or the new authorities 
themselves succumbed to temptation (Harsch, 1993). 
Elaborate speeches and structures do not necessarily 
translate into ethical behaviour. Policies must be matched 
by action in order to leave any dent on the solid walls of 
corruption. One of the major reasons why formulating 
effective and sustainable measures to reduce corruption 
in Nigeria has proved hitherto elusive is because the 
country’s political system is historically configured 
to pardon (even reward) corruption, not punish it. As 
shown earlier, the lack of commitment to detecting and 
punishing unethical behaviour was carried to its extreme 
under Babangida’s regime, and has been reproduced 
ever since. The willingness of the Nigerian ruling class 
to embrace convicted criminals and to recycle corrupt 
leaders has, time and again, undermined the entire anti-
corruption campaign in the country. Unless corruption is 
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made “difficult” and “inconvenient”, as the late Professor 
Achebe argues, even the prayer against bribery and 
corruption, composed in 1998 by the Catholic Bishops 
Conference of Nigeria and recited in every Catholic mass 
in the country, will remain a distant dream:
Father in heaven, you always provide for all your 
creatures so that all may live as you have willed. You 
have blessed our country Nigeria with rich human and 
natural resources to be used to your honour and glory and 
for the wellbeing of every Nigerian. We are deeply sorry 
for the wrong use of these your gift and blessing through 
acts of injustice, bribery and corruption, as a result of 
which many of our people are hungry, sick, ignorant 
and defenceless. Father, you alone can heal us and our 
nation of this sickness. We beg you; touch our lives and 
the lives of our leaders and people so that we may all 
realise the evil effect of bribery and corruption and work 
hard to eliminate it. Raise up for us God-fearing people 
and leaders who care for us and who will lead us in the 
path of peace, prosperity and progress (Catholic Bishop 
Conference of Nigeria, 1998).
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